OCTOBER 25, 1980
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Submitted to:
|
GOVERNOR RONALD REAGAN
William Casey |
FROM:
|
HERB COHEN
– Executive Director
POWER NEGOTIATIONS INSTITUTE® |
SUBJECT:
|
THE MISHANDLING OF THE
“IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS”
A background analysis
and strategic approach, for
use in facilitating the release of the Americans
held captive. |
|
(This document was the memorandum referred to by syndicated Columnist
Jack Anderson in the aforementioned article, which first appeared in the
Washington Post on February 12, 1981).
For almost a year President Jimmy
Carter has been enmeshed, entangled and exasperated by the enigma known
as, “The Iranian Hostage Crisis”. Throughout this period,
despite well-publicized gestures, considerable activity and
uncoordinated efforts, he has been unable to bring this tragic episode
to a successful conclusion. Indeed, given all the media coverage
of movement without progress, dashed hopes and unrealized plans – – all
amid the staged background spectacle of thousands of chanting marchers
– this lingering affair has taken on a mythic or theatrical
quality. So, we are still mired in Wonderland, where the Red Queen
is the sickly, senile Khomeni, the drowsy door mouse, an American
President and Alice, the figure of reason, out on an extended “coffee
break”.
From the outset, we have been negotiating with a tough, cynical
and criminal adversary, who has been trying to extract an extortionary
price for the return of our illegally detained diplomats.
The arena may be International Diplomacy and the stakes human
lives, but Khomeni and his mullahs, have been operating like rug
merchants in the classic Persian Rug Sellers Bazaar.
To them, these innocent Americans are merchandise or “rugs for
sale” and they have consistently manipulated our media, our emotions
and more significantly, a United States President, in their attempt to
secure a maximum selling price.
Since January, the Carter Administration has vacillated and
zigzagged, without any coherent or consistent strategy to secure the
release of the hostages. Displaying more symbolism than substance and an embarrassing
incapacity to manage the flow of events, the Administration’s overall
handling of this matter has even given ineptitude a bad name. The President himself has been the embodiment of
irresolution, seemingly unable or unwilling, to exercise and maintain
the initiatives necessary to induce responsible civilized behavior on
the part of Iran’s Revolutionary Regime.
More pointedly, his response to this outrage has been so erratic
and incongruous that it serves to underscore an unfortunate but growing
public perception that he may be willing to compromise national values,
principles and interests, to secure re-election to office.
To fully understand the present Presidential predicament, it is
necessary to go back to some of the underlying dynamics, which give rise
to the continuing crisis:
By October1979, it became evident to Khomeni and his
fundamentalist followers on the Revolutionary Council that the success
of their “divine mission” was being threatened short of its goal
— a return to the “golden Age of Shi’ism”. From the Imam’s
perspective the revolution was beginning to flounder.
Bogged-down by the reappearance of pre-existing attitudes, values
and life styles, religious fervor and radical zeal were abating.
Mismanagement of the economy was causing disaffection among
secular elements and the ruling clergy were being challenged on several
fronts by separatist and ethnic groups.
Suddenly, Khomeni and his disciples were confronted with an
unacceptable possibility. What they had believed was a Pro-Islamic movement, might
actually have been primarily an Anti-Shah uprising.
Thus, they were looking for an issue that could be used to
revitalize the flagging spirits of the people and restore unity and
purpose to the revolution – which in their eyes still had a long way
to go. Fortuitously, the
Shah’s entry to the United States for medical treatment provided a
convenient focal event that could be used to meet these underlying
concerns, interests and needs.
Clearly, the Shah was a vulnerable target, who could be accepted
and used as the personification of evil.
For that reason the mullah’s strategy was to focus all
attention on him. Their
initial implementing tactic was the simultaneous seizure of the United
States Embassy in Teheran and the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor.
Although reported as “spontaneous acts by students”, it
should have been evident from the outset that this was
government-sponsored terrorism by surrogate soldiers – carefully
planned and coordinated operations.
In effect, this was “The Persian Version of Dog Day Afternoon”,
intended to create an international audience before whom they could air
their grievances and extract concessions.
In the main, Khomeni and his medieval-minded mullahs were
behaving quite logically (considering their mindset), in pursuit of the
following objectives:
1.
To unify a fragmented nation and encourage greater personal
sacrifice by fueling a common hatred of the Shah and his “agents”
held captive in the Embassy.
2.
To exorcise all Western (American) cultural influences from Iran,
as modern life styles and material conveniences were seen as major
obstacles to the restoration of a mullah-dominated Islamic State.
3.
To further radicalize the revolution, purging secular and
moderate elements in the process, thereby insuring the passage of an
Islamic Constitution.
4.
To publicize their magnified grievances against the Shah, which
could be used to justify future revolutionary excesses, economic
deprivations and gross human rights violations.
5.
To ignite the Middle East with Khomeni’s brand of revolutionary
and fundamental Islamic Shi’ism.
President Carter’s initial response to this outrage was an
admirable exercise of restraint and patience.
Basically he did nothing and did it well.
But then again, some might say, “He was experienced at doing
nothing!”
Still, once the Iranian holidays passed in mid-December and the
physical safety of the hostages virtually assured, the president could
have managed events to secure their release without compromising
national interests. But to
his surprise, the captivity became a political advantage, helping defeat
Senator Edward Kennedy’s bid for the Democratic nomination. Playing
upon the concern of the American people, Mr. Carter, unknowingly at
first, made the hostages the “centerpiece” of his administration. This was underscored by the unprecedented media attention,
which revealed that the Commander-In-Chief was consumed by this issue,
praying for the detained diplomats and their captors morning and night.
Yet, this myopic focus, combined with the “Rose Garden Strategy”
– an unwillingness to leave the White House to campaign and debate
Senator Kennedy, further emphasized the importance of this matter and
the value of hostages.
While this approach may have caused President Carter to
temporarily soar in domestic popularity, it shocked our allies, but even
worse, it resulted in increased demands.
Keep in mind, that we were, and still are, dealing with people
possessed of a “bazaar mindset”, who view our diplomats as valuable
merchandise, to be sold back to us at a price.
So, this pervasive need of our “Chief Buyer” only caused the
value of the “rugs” to increase in the eyes of the Iranian mullahs
and their surrogate student-terrorists.
Playing to the concerns of the American people and his own rising
political fortunes, Mr. Carter publicly announced that we had no options
in this situation. By mid-January we were doing nothing and proud of it,
expressing impotency via a policy of “watchful waiting”.
In essence, we removed any incentives (either positive or
negative) that the Iranians might have had to negotiate with us,
allowing the situation to drift from crisis to permanence.
From the mullahs perspective, the detriments of retaining the
hostages were now minimal, but the advantages substantial.
Ergo, the virtually risk-free captivity could be used by them to
achieve many of their objectives. As a result secular elements were
purged from government and the Islamic Constitution was ratified
overwhelmingly. The
hostages served them well, as a rallying point for national unity, that
is, until the Iraqi invasion conveniently came along. They had succeeded in gaining internal and external publicity
for their complaints against the Shah and the holding of the hostages
settled into routine, with little palpable protest by the world as a
whole.
Accordingly, the hostages became central pawns in the
never-ending struggle for power taking place among Iranian Revolutionary
Groups. Rival factions and
personalities maneuvered for dominant influence, each trying to gain the
ear of Khomeni, the country’s supreme power.
And with the failure of the United Nation’s Commission, it was
evident, that he threw his weight behind the advocates of continuing
chaos in their conflict with those who sought a return to normalcy.
The captors and their supporters came to believe that they had
this Administration over a barrel.
As President Carter’s policy softened, their position became
tougher, using the old “Rug Sellers Negotiation Ploy” of raising the
price each time a bid was made for the hostages’ release.
For the student-terrorists and their chanting supporters outside,
the crisis became a people’s carnival, a school holiday, a complete
vacation from responsibility and authority.
As Bani Sadr and few others realized, this continued festival was
in reality, a diversion from the real work and sacrifice required to
build a nation.
We should have known there was little chance appealing to
fundamental Shia Muslims through our value system.
There is nothing in Khomeni’s Koran about détente, compromise
or reasoning. While we were
defensive, apologetic and forgiving, he was aggressive, confident and
inflexible. In expecting kindness and compassion from Khomeni or his
clerics, we should have remembered the Old Persian Proverb; “There are
three things I have never seen – the eye of an ant, the foot of a
snake and the charity of a mullah”.
Fundamentally, we were “reading from a different hymnbook”.
Though recognizing the Iranians have some grounds for bitterness
and that ultimately, they will need a graceful way out of this dilemma
of their own devising, we should not have precluded the possible
exercise of power to shape their decision-making.
This was a negotiation from the outset and it was hurting our
bargaining position by continually eliminating options and displaying a
reluctance to act in the face of government-sponsored terrorism.
The recipe of “watching waiting” could only produce a dish of
vindication for the politics of international terrorism.
We have always owed it to the hostages to make sure that the
terms of their release did not legitimize their capture and put
Americans all over the world in peril. Continued American passivity in
the face of the criminal behavior, has been seen as a loss of nerve with
the obvious conclusion that we can be taken on with impunity.
If we were not willing to act and take some risk in this
situation where we were certified by the United Nations and the
International Court as being in the right, for the sake of what, might
we be expected to do so?
The issue at stake was never the Shah or Iran versus the United
States in a contest of wills. Rather
it was Iran versus the civilized world in a criminal breach of
International Law. From the beginning, President Carter should have said
to the Iranians that our standards of asylum would not be dictated by
the illegal seizure of hostages. We should have been seen as standing clearly on principles
that command respect.
Instead of keeping the focus on Iranian outlawry, we became
publicly involved in the Shah’s whereabouts and medical condition.
We would not let him in, then we would, then he would have to
move, then we would not let him stay, then we promised that if he left
he could come back and then we did not want him to leave Panama.
In this absurd sequence of events, we compromised our principles
and displayed a policy of accommodation that was perceived in Iran and
the rest of the world as weakness.
Each concession made to these criminals, without getting anything
in return, has only whetted their appetite and caused them to raise the
ante. We have gone from
dispatching Ramsey Clark, beseeching Kurt Waldheim, embracing Valerian
Cappuci to involving all sorts of unpredictable and risky third party
amateurs. We have been
grasping at straws, practicing capitulation and compromise in a futile
attempt to appease enraged outlaws.
As any competent negotiator, leader, politician or consumer
knows, in order to get anyone to negotiate with you in good faith they
must believe that you can, and just might, bring about intended effects,
which they perceive might help them or hurt them.
Neither a potential seller, nor the current Iranian Regime, will
change their negotiating posture unless they understand that we are
capable of giving them something that they want, or just might do
something to them now or later, that they regard as detrimental to their
interests and objectives.
Therefore, to publicly rule out options such as military force or
even retribution, was to eliminate incentives for negotiation.
It was no way to break the impasse.
On the contrary, it invited the student-terrorists to hang onto
their captives and milk the situation for everything they could get.
Instead, these adversaries should have been made to feel that
they have something to gain in negotiating in good faith and much to
fear if they don’t.
The real power in Iran has always been Khomeni and he is a tough
bargainer, who sees “concession behavior” as a sign of weakness.
We should never have made payments-in-advance.
Alternately we should have put pressure on Iran, to strengthen
the hand of the realists on the Revolutionary Council, and give, even
the unreasoning, an incentive to put the crisis behind them.
America could have speeded the process by acting in ways that
gave the realists and true revolutionaries cause for concern; by
incrementally increasing the pressure on Iran through measured and
calibrated actions, we would have forced a confrontation between the
militants and some emerging government that wanted to prove that it was
really a government.
W hat President Carter never exhibited was a comprehensive “game
plan” and consistent implementing tactics to achieve the release of
the hostages. If he wanted
to break the stalemate, Iran should have been given a message from our
coherent behavior, that the longer the impasse existed, the greater
would be the risks for them.
Our actions should have been consistent and there should always
have been follow-through. While
incrementally building pressure on Iran, President Carter should have
preserved and cultivated “back channels” of communication, as a
safeguard against misreading of signals and to insure that no
opportunity was lost for fruitful negotiation.
Since this was not done, it has raised questions of judgment and
perhaps even motive, on the part of our Chief Executive Officer.
Certainly, President Carter has had his “magnificent obsession”
about getting the hostages back, but he has done nothing for almost nine
months. The only departure
from our public display of impotence was, “The Jimmy Carter Desert
Classic” (the botched rescue attempt), an action that undermined the
commitment of the Western alliance and shook the nation’s confidence
in our defense establishment.
As noted previously, Khomeni and his mullahs realize that they
are selling hostages to an anxious buyer. From
their mindset, they know the maximum price that can be extorted from
this administration will come just prior to the election, when a
politically ambitious incumbent might conceivably pay a top price to
assure his re-election. To put it bluntly, any experienced negotiator or
bazaar vendor recognized that, on November 5th, the Iranians will be
forced to put their "illegally obtained merchandise" on sale
at a cut-rate price. In short, after the election (regardless of
outcome), bargaining leverage will shift, causing the hostages to go on
sale – at 40% off!
Should an agreement be reached prior to the election, the cost of
freedom for the fifty-two hostages will come high.
The Iranian leaders will get their best possible payoff from an
act of terrorism. Yet, if the agreement is not consummated within the next
week, there will be a shift of power that will enable us to buy back our
hostages, at a cost that will not approximate the paying of
blackmail or ransom to criminals. Hopefully,
President Carter will recognize this reality and wait patiently until
after the election to negotiate from greater strength.
There is a negotiating truism, that most concession behavior and
settlements occur at “the deadline”.
Accordingly one of the reasons that this crisis has dragged on
endlessly, has been the passive (reactive) policy of the Carter
Administration, which never caused the keeping of the hostages to become
so burdensome, that the Iranians felt the need to put a deadline on
themselves. President
Carter’s handling virtually told them that in retaining the hostages
they’d run no risk and incur no cost.
Thus, the assets or advantages of maintaining their criminal
behavior (using the hostages – as pawns in their internal power
struggle, as a rallying point for national unity and to keep their
revolution rolling) always exceeded the liabilities or disadvantages.
Now, however, the Iraqi invasion has not only magnified the
detriments of keeping the hostages (the need for hard currency and spare
parts), but it has given the mullahs a “new Satan”.
Fundamentalists can use this “holy war” as a rallying point
to consolidate and stabilize their revolution, while at the same time
bludgeon Bani Sadr and the moderates for improper conduct of the fray.
Of course, these factors will still be in existence after our
election, when the current administration can finally resolve this
crisis.
It should not come as a shock that the ruling mullahs have a
different timetable in mind. From
their perspective, the “52 hot rugs” will bring the highest price
this coming week, prior to our Presidential election.
In fact, all indications are that the Ayatollah had this timing
in mind, when he deliberately stalled the announcement of his "Four
Conditions" until September 12th. This carefully calculated
date would have given Iran and U.S. negotiators a full six weeks to
conclude the buy-sell transaction, at a time more favorable to the
seller. Therefore, any "October Surprise" was never
Carter’s, but Khomeni’s. Regrettably, our
"Purchasing-Agent-President", has been an "innocent
patsy" simply reacting to the moves of the unscrupulous Ohomeni.
Succinctly put, Jimmy Carter has been on an emotional roller coaster
ride with the rest of the American people – only he was in the first
car.
From all appearances, Khomeni’s scheme was to “cut the deal”
when his bargaining leverage was at a maximum.
It might have worked had the unexpected not occurred.
This was not just Iraq’s full-scale invasion of Iran, but
Saddam Hussein’s widely publicized news dispatch that Khomeni released
the fifty-two hostages in return for American support.
Since the “morally-directed Ayatollah” could not be seen as
being in league with “the great Satan”, informal contact and
negotiations were broken off, thereby dispelling any rumors that an
agreement was, or might be, “in the works”.
However, the two to three week hiatus, taken to invalidate the
Iraqi news dispatch, may well bury Khomeni’s carefully planned scheme.
It seems inconceivable, that the short negotiating time
remaining, can permit the extensive and complicated bargaining necessary
to come to a binding agreement that would return the hostages.
Furthermore, there are at least three other factors that preclude
any possibility that the current “informal negotiations” might prove
fruitful, prior to Election Day – November 4, 1980:
First,
the unfreezing of Iranian assets present enormously complex
problems, involving a multitude of financial and governmental
institutions, that will take time to work out.
Second,
it is unlikely that Khomeni would be willing to negotiate formally with
the United States. So, additional delay must occur in the selection and
use of a third party intermediary that will be acceptable to all sides.
Third,
the fragmented student terrorists, the Majlis, and the general
public, have not been adequately prepared for such a sharp reversal or
departure from what they have been hearing and believing was Khomeni’s
policy. As Machiavelli has
said, “It takes time to get used to a new idea”.
Thus
there should be no “October Surprise” that might influence the
outcome of the election. And
so, it is probable that Governor Reagan will be the President-elect on
November 5th.
Should
this scenario transpire, the Carter “lame duck” administration will
be in an excellent position to negotiate a “palatable agreement” to
secure the release of the fifty-two hostages.
This probability will occur if the Iranians come to believe that
the new Republican Administration will take a much tougher approach to
this criminal breach of international law.
If, by word or deed, the President-Elect and his spokesmen make
clear that there will be a radical departure from existing policies with
respect to government-sponsored terrorism the Iranians will view
Inauguration Day as their final deadline.
As a result, they will select the option of dealing with Carter,
“the Satan Known”, rather than Reagan, -“The Satan Unknown”.
Although
the internal political circus in Iran cannot be predicted with absolute
certainty, if President Elect Reagan, comes on strong the mullahs will
be faced with a "Good-Guy-Bad-Guy" choice, imposing a deadline
on themselves of January 20 at 1:00pm for the resolution of this crisis.
Following is the rationale for this denouement date:
1.
Doubtlessly, it is the intention of Khomeni and the mullahs to prolong the war with Iraq, which means they
will need to strengthen the Revolutionary Guards and obtain badly needed
hard currency.
2.
Khomeni’s four conditions, which omits the demand for a U.S.
apology, indicates a softening of terms and a willingness to settle this
matter.
3.
Iranian Prime Minister Rajai lacks the political courage to make
the decision himself now, but he can syndicate this risk by going to the
Majlis, which will take a few months.
4.
The failure of Bani Sadr as Commander-in-Chief, to make progress
against the Iraqi invaders has given the mullahs an issue that can be
used to undermine the moderates – a convenient substitute for the
hostages.
5.
In the past, the Mujahadeen (whom the mullahs do not control),
prevented Bani Sadr from transferring the hostages from the
student-terrorists to the government, when in April 1980, they massed in
great numbers outside the Embassy.
This blocking maneuver is no longer possible, since the hostages
have been dispersed to locations unknown.
6.
The Iranian perception of Ronald Reagan is that he comes from a
“fast draw cowboy tradition” of shooting first and asking questions
later. Assuming that as
President-Elect, this image is maintained and even enhanced (e.g. by
making reference to the Embassy takeover as intolerable criminal
behavior), when he is about to take the oath of office Khomeni will do a
fast cost-benefit analysis of the situation and take what by contrast,
the reasonable but out-going Jimmy Carter has offered.
From their viewpoint, with the departure of the current
incumbent, America’s Chief Buyer, will go his offers and their
investment in the relationship. At
best, they will have to start all over again – back to square one –
with a new, albeit combative President – an unpredictable and
potentially dangerous top Purchasing Agent.
Moreover, the Iranian experience with President Jimmy Carter
causes them to view him as an indecisive “paper tiger”, who can be
mapped and manipulated with ease, whereas Ronald Reagan is seen in Iran
as a person who means what he says.
Finally,
the Carter Administration’s handling of the drawn-out crisis has
resulted in the steady erosion of our bargaining position, giving the
Iranians a kill as well as a chase – as they engaged in the sport of
“Diplomat Hunting”. A prolonged policy of watching and waiting and
public declarations that we have no options was and is a bankrupt
strategy. From the outset,
the health and well being of fifty-three innocent Americans and their
families, required that we operate as experienced negotiators and not as
amateurs. Ultimately, the
success of this “buy-sell transaction” will be determined not
just by whether we secure the safe release of the hostages.
But there are other fundamental questions, perhaps even more
important, that only history can answer:
1.
Will our passivity serve to encourage future criminal
undertakings of this nature and embolden international terrorists?
2.
Has our handling of this matter gained the respect of our Allies
and Third World Nations?
3.
How will our unwillingness to take risk, sustain casualties and
exercise power be perceived by future antagonists?
4.
To what extent, have we abandoned our traditional concepts of
honor and principle in the face of this terrorist extortion?
5.
Will the concessions made to Iran adversely affect our
relationship with the Arab nations and the balance of power in the
Middle East?
Admittedly, President Carter’s initial restraint after the
Embassy seizure was commendable. Nevertheless,
in the following ten months, this patience was needlessly prolonged and
transformed into a policy of paralysis.
His mishandling of this crisis has shaken the confidence of the
American people, as well as our allies in other parts of the world.
The only beneficiaries from the failure to manage this
geopolitical negotiation have been the Iranian mullahs, the Kremlin
leadership and the temporary political fortunes of Jimmy Carter himself.
Essentially, he has pursued a policy of patience without
pressure, which was perceived as paralysis in Teheran.
Obviously, a nation that is unwilling or unable to take risk to
manage its destiny will inevitably become manipulated against its own
interests.
On November 5th, there still will be time to look at this tragic crisis
realistically, to stand up for what we believe before the world and if
necessary, give our goodness some muscle. Above all, we must stop
all the ignorant and futile self-recrimination, which only saps our
self-confidence and our will.
If, as Dickens said, “We forge the chains we wear in life”,
then resolve, combined with a sustained negotiating strategy, are the
shears that can finally set the hostages and all America free.
….Herb
Cohen |