History
contains many watersheds, those crucial periods in which the mainstream
of policies and actions is diverted into new channels. Recently
such an event occurred when Saddam Hussein engaged in unprovoked
aggression against Kuwait, a place that is more a blockbuster bank
account than a modern state. Iraq’s crime was unambiguous: the
conquest and looting of its tiny neighbor.
Faced with this challenge, President George Bush acted with courage and
dispatch. While sending American troops to the area, he adeptly
mobilized a multi-national collective security effort for the purpose of
confronting the aggressor nation with diplomatic, military and economic
pressure. The aim of these actions according to Mr. Bush, was to
get Saddam to disgorge Kuwait and re-establish the al-Sabbah regime, to
protect the security of the world’s largest oil producing nation and
the freeing of the foreign nationals held hostage. Yet if Iraq
literally complies with these conditions, it would leave its war machine
intact, enabling them to resume their protection racket and aggressions
after the siege has been lifted and they have the opportunity to develop
more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction.
Although a person of congeniality and integrity, George Bush was elected
to office without a mandate and without having to specify his goals
(“You know, the vision thing”). Consequently, Americans have
gotten what we voted for, a scattershot flip-flop administration that
has been more concerned with our nation’s critical problems: the
growing budget deficit, the trade imbalance, the precarious condition of
financial institutions and the deterioration of urban life.
Instead, Mr. Bush anointed himself “ The Education President”,
declared war on drugs, spoke out against flag burning and even found the
time to criticize Roseanne Barr’s rendition of the Star Spangled
Banner.
Unlike his predecessor, George Bush does not have a set of core
principles. A politician of
convenience and conciliation, it is his nature to seek consensus
solutions to problems. He
knows what he does not want, but not quite what he wants.
Characteristically, he is now in the process of frenetic telephone
activity with world leaders, from Brazil to Bangladesh, but has not
thought much about the ultimate consequences of what he is doing.
Perhaps this should not be surprising when our commander-in-chief
is making his military decisions and issuing communiqués from a golf
cart while on vacation in Kennebunkport, Maine.
Having said all this, it should be noted that President Bush performed
well at the outset in re-framing what was at stake in this conflict.
Instead of Saddam Hussein, the champion of the Arab have-nots, versus
the imperialistic United States allied with the wealthy Arab Gulf
States, the civilized world now views this crisis as Saddam versus
American, Britain and its coalition partners, which include Arab and
Muslim States. In doing this, he has been showered with
international acclaim and his approval rating at home has soared.
Amidst this applause, Mr. Bush has gotten himself caught in an
“activity trap”, as he seeks to further augment his coalition beyond
practical limits. Unmistakably, he does not realize the inevitable
detriments of such an expansive and cumbersome affiliation.
One problem with such an unwieldy coalition is that it tends to inhibit
unilateral action. For example, a preemptive first strike if it is
necessary to save lives and prevent widespread economic and political
dislocation.
Secondly, in the quest for massive multilateralism,
overtures and concessions are being made to the Soviet Union, China and
France, nations whose national interests do not always coincide with
ours. By that I mean that these countries acting in their own
political and economic interests, will not want Saddam defeated and
deposed. In the case of Gorbachev, a quick and decisive
Anglo-American victory might produce an adverse impact on his growing
Muslim population. As for France and China, over the years they
have earned billions of dollars as Iraq’s military suppliers and would
like to see this continue.
Thirdly, whenever you put together an extensive ad hoc alliance you may
be forced to forego or at least fudge your national principles.
And if nothing else, the Presidency of Ronald Reagan should have
illustrated that when Americans are given a choice, they prefer
principles over partners.
Finally, in the rush to broaden the conjoinment against Iraq, we have
already contacted Syria and made back door overtures to faction-ridden
Iran. Considering the bloody past of Haffez Assad and the Persian
links to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in
1988, why are we moving so quickly? Before becoming affiliated
with these nations in this endeavor, we should at least ask them to stop
supporting groups that are engaged in acts of violence against Western
civilizations. Moreover, when Syria becomes part of the coalition
against Iraq, Assad will see his payment as a free hand to move against
Christian General Michel Aoun in order to extend his occupation of
Lebanon – one step closer to his goal of “A Greater Syria”.
So despite his current popularity, Mr. Bush may be “painting himself
into a corner”. His goals appear superficial, the lengths to
which he will go unclear and his larger political conception
unarticulated. Indeed, he seems to be having a difficult time explaining
to his constituency what we might be fighting and dying for. In
one speech he said we are over there to protect “our way of life”.
Then he said something about defending democracy against unprovoked
aggression. Eventually, in a quest for a higher-sounding cause, he
invoked “a new international order”. Ironically, this sounds
like some rhetoric left over from the “Third Reich”.
Is the United States to embark on permanent intervention in a region
that is structurally unstable? Are we going to become enmeshed in
the problems of Pan Arabism, Islamic fundamentalism and Palestinian
aspirations? How do we deal with the history of exploitation and
the current reality of pervasive envy between the rich and poor nations
in that area?
Hopefully, the Bush Administration is contemplating these and other
question as we become enmeshed in the Byzantine labyrinth that is the
Muslim Middle East. Although the United States and others committed
forces at the request of the Saudis, they have always been ambivalent
and covert about developing any genuine relationships with the United
States and Western democracies. But then again, this may be
understandable from their point of view. The Saudis know who they
are and where they live. Clearly when one resides in a
neighborhood surrounded by three 800-pound gorillas, it is always wise
to take this fact into your calculations and decision-making.
Therefore, there is always the possibility that a back channel deal may
be struck, whereby Saddam would withdraw from Kuwait in return for
financial and territorial concessions. Where would this leave
President Bush when King Faud tells us that our military help is no
longer required and requests that we withdraw our forces? This
nightmare scenario would leave Iraq with its leadership and menacing
arsenal intact. Although Mr. Bush might try to sell this so-called
“arab solution” as a victory, it would be seen throughout the world
as a major defeat for the United States.
Thus far we have been looking at this crisis from an American
perspective, but there is another major player in this international
drama: Saddam Hussein al Takrit. Consequently, we must guard
against any inclination to ascribe our beliefs, values,
concerns and aspirations upon him. Such “mirror-imaging”,
obscuring reality by superimposing upon it a wishful image, can be very
misleading especially when projected upon this particular antagonist.
To the West, Saddam Hussein seems little more than a brutal thug, driven
by blind ambition and reckless impulse. But in the context of his
own dark conspiratorial world, he is a somewhat predictable and
pragmatic creature, a man of charm, cunning and cruelty surrounded by
party loyalists who are held in check by fear.
Though the West may have been surprised by the adulation that the Arab
masses have heaped upon him in the aftermath of Iraq’s attack upon
Kuwait, this was virtually inevitable. Saddam, who has long posed
as a champion of militant Arab nationalism, responds to a deep-seated
need that his supporters have for a warrior father figure who can
rectify the wrongs done by the Ottoman Turks, The European colonizers,
The Zionists and the secular non-believing Americans.
Whereas it is fashionable in some circles to view Saddam’s firing of
the Gulf’s guns of August as an impetuous, reckless and irrational
act, all indications are that it was a carefully calculated move that
made eminent sense.
From his standpoint, Iraq had sustained considerable losses and incurred
enormous debt fighting an eight-year war with Iran to protect the
sovereignty of the wealthy, but ungrateful Gulf States. By moving
against his helpless neighbor, Saddam believed he could accomplish six
major objectives:
1. Expunge his largest debts which consisted of $22
billion owed Kuwait and $28 billion owed to Saudi Arabia.
2. Seize control of the K10, which manages the $100
billion in Kuwait overseas investments. Last year alone $8.8
billion was earned from these funds, which far exceeded the $7.7 billion
that the government derived from its old exports.
3. Take possession of the $3 to $5 billion in gold
bullion that was stored in the Kuwait Central Bank
4. Obtain better access to the Persian Gulf
5. Raise the worldwide price of oil, which had
dropped below $20 a barrel. Since 85% of Iraq’s exports are oil
the pricing of this commodity is a sensitive issue.
6. Gain recognition as the leader of the Pan Arab
movement. He would be the new Nasser and perhaps eventually the
heir of Nebuchadnezzar, the ruler of ancient Mesopotamia.
Based upon the American Administration’s “kinder and gentler”
handling of Saddam in the months prior to his August 2nd blitzkrieg,
these objectives seemed obtainable. After all, we had overlooked
his use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, recently extended $300
million in credits to enable him to purchase our wheat and rice,
apologized for a Voice of America broadcast that he had found offensive
and Assistant Secretary of State had publicly testified before Congress
that we had no intention of getting involved in any intra-Arab dispute
between Iraq and Kuwait. In short, the Bush administration made
the invasion of Kuwait look like a free lunch. Unfortunately for
all concerned, Saddam Hussein misjudged the international mood and the
reaction of King Faud who, to his surprise, called for assistance.
Doubtlessly, he was shocked by the quick response of the United States
and Britain, to the point that he remarked, “What’s the matter with
George Bush and Mrs. Thatcher, have they gone mad!”
At this point in time, both the protagonist and antagonist are at
loggerheads, having limited their options considerably. Saddam
Hussein has isolated himself by his act of aggression which is being
further compounded by his overblown rhetoric as he pillages and
dismembers Kuwait. George Bush, on the other hand, acting under
the cover of United Nations resolutions and international law has
“drawn a line in the sand”, while comparing Saddam to Hitler.
More Significantly, Mr. Bush keeps increasing the size and scope of his
alliance as he proceeds with the greatest buildup of American ground
forces since the conflict in Viet Nam.
He still says he seeks “a peaceful outcome” but his original
tripwire contingent of forces in Saudi Arabia is growing daily by leaps
and bounds. And once invested it will be politically impossible
for him to divest. The road to war, it seems, is paved with
peaceful declarations and massive deployments.
There are those who argue quite reasonable and responsible that
diplomacy must be given time to work. But by mid-December time
will be on Mr. Hussein’s side, the American public will be getting
impatient, costs will be mounting and the alliance will be showing signs
of strain. By then it will be evident that the embargos and
blockage only weakened Iraq marginally. Pursuing this course, the
first to suffer will be the Kuwaitis, followed by foreign nationals and
then Iraqi children. Certainly, neither Saddam’s neighbors nor
the world would enforce a policy that results in the starvation of
children. Regrettably history contains no encouraging precedents
of such action working against a nation state.
Although no one should want to sacrifice young lives in a war with Iraq,
this possibility has been thrust upon us by the actions of others and by
the choices we have already made. The issue is no longer, “Can
we honorably avoid war?” but “How can we quickly conclude the war
that has already begun with the least loss of lives and economic
dislocation?” In fact, how we win may be as important as winning
itself.
George Bush is now confronted with distasteful alternatives. If in
an attempt to avoid more bloodshed we accept a brokered deal that would
allow Saddam to pull out of Kuwait with his military and weapons of mass
destruction intact, we are merely postponing the inevitable.
Considering his ambition and dreams, he cannot be trusted to abide by
the terms of any settlement he might make. Recall that Saddam
himself signed the Algiers Accord in 1975, which was a peace treaty
between Iran and Iraq. Five years later without warning, Iraq
invaded an Iran that was weakened by it revolutionary upheavals.
So we are now moving to the point of no return. Time is of the
essence. With every passing day additional Westerners will be
rounded up to be used as hostages, the Iraqi ground forces will be
digging in deeper (all the more difficult to dislodge) and there will be
the opportunity for the occupiers to wire the Kuwait oil fields and
production facilities with explosives.
Given the current state of affairs, only a preemptive surgical first
strike can spare us from these undesirable events and their
consequences. Even those concerned with compromise solutions and
restraint might have to agree that a short conclusive crisis is
preferable to a long inconclusive siege. The American people are
not prepared to wage a long and costly war to make the world safe for
monarchy. The Saudis will eventually grow impatient with the large
numbers of American soldiers deployed in their midst. The United
States Congress will soon get around to making inquiries and will want a
greater share in the decision-making process. The situational
stability within the Middle East is likely to change if a stalemate
develops. The international consensus that has been established
may start to unravel as national costs will multiply accompanied by
increased unemployment and economic dislocation worldwide.
Currently Mr. Bush has widespread support for taking direct action
against Iraq, but this condition and opportunity will not last
indefinitely. As the leader of the collective alliance arrayed
against aggression he must be prepared to act by November 15th, relying
upon British and American air and naval forces, to bring down Saddam
Hussein and destroy all of his military assets.
Of course, this is not the definitive date for launching an attack.
It is however, the start of a time period when the oppressive Saudi heat
abates and the dust diminishes. More significantly, if the
administration does not have a specific timetable in mind it will find
that it can easily be distracted by compromise proposals that are
dangled before their eyes.
In the coming months Saddam will start his public relations campaign by
periodically releasing hostages and using a variety of intermediaries,
from King Hussein to Mikhail Gorbachev, in order to stall the deployment
of forces. He will float appealing proposals and allude to
concessions he might be willing to make, all for the purpose of testing
the cohesion and staying power of the alliance that Mr. Bush is
assembling.
When this doesn’t work he may try to resurrect the dormant United
States “peace movement”, with talk of American boys returning in
body bags. Finally, he may even offer to withdraw from Kuwait,
providing he gets to keep control of the Rumallah oil fields and Bubiyan
and Warba islands in the Persian Gulf. As part of this overture he
would insist that democratic elections be held under the auspices of the
Arab League or The United Nations. Naturally he would try to rig
the outcome by allowing only those who are currently residing in the new
territory to vote.
Although such a deal would fall far short of President Bush’s minimum
conditions (the restoration of the status quo ante), many of our
so-called allies and some Americans would see this as a basis for
starting negotiations that might avoid a military conflict.
From Saddam’s perspective such a tantalizing offer would be a stall
intended to buy time and sow disunity among this broad and disparate
coalition assembled by Mr. Bush.
Beyond this strategy there are other diversions that Saddam can create
and exploit. First there is the plight of Western hostages that he
may use as bargaining chips. Secondly there is the survival and
well being of the Kuwaiti citizens who might be forced to relocate.
Third there is the threat that he might release a Brigade of Terrorists
in an attempt to de-stabilize some of the Gulf States. Lastly
there is always Israel, who he might try to provoke into an overreaction
to an act of terrorism, thereby shifting attention away from the rape of
Kuwait to the archenemy of the Pan-Arab Crusade.
Assuming that Mr. Bush stays in character and the core of his
constituency remains supportive, the Gulf Crisis will reach its apex
this fall. When war comes, our objective should be to make it as
swift, violent and as far-reaching as possible. We must hit the
enemy at its heart, Iraq itself, destroying its aircraft, airfields,
embryonic nuclear facilities, SCUD missile sights, chemical weapons
facilities and its attacking the enemy at its strongest point, in the
expected place, instead of exploiting surprise and our advantages in
high technology and mobile warfare.
Despite what Carl von Clausewitz called the problems that develop in,
“the fog and friction of war”, there is every reason to believe that
Saddam and his war machine can be destroyed without incurring
substantial casualties. Just as important perhaps, are the
consequences that will ensue from this Anglo-American victory.
Clearly we must be planning now for the aftermath of this conflict to
make sure that this war was worth fighting and winning
Of course, the wealthy Gulf States and perhaps even Japan, should be
expected to help pay for the relocation of hundreds of thousands of
displaced people and unemployed soldiers, as well as the essential
infrastructure repairs. Also it will be necessary to leave a
multinational Arab force in the area. But under no circumstances
should we permanently station American troops in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or
Iraq, as this would only increase anti-Western sentiment and work
against our own national interests.
While we regret the loss of any lives, clearly Saddam’s actions
constitute a clear provocation that must be confronted. If history
has taught us nothing else, the lesson of Munich was, “sooner’s
better than later”.
……Herb Cohen