THE SIDNEY INSTITUTE

GAMBLE IN THE GULF

"Events are in the saddle and they ride mankind."

          History contains many watersheds, those crucial periods in which the mainstream of policies and actions is diverted into new channels.  Recently such an event occurred when Saddam Hussein engaged in unprovoked aggression against Kuwait, a place that is more a blockbuster bank account than a modern state.  Iraq’s crime was unambiguous: the conquest and looting of its tiny neighbor.

          Faced with this challenge, President George Bush acted with courage and dispatch.  While sending American troops to the area, he adeptly mobilized a multi-national collective security effort for the purpose of confronting the aggressor nation with diplomatic, military and economic pressure.  The aim of these actions according to Mr. Bush, was to get Saddam to disgorge Kuwait and re-establish the al-Sabbah regime, to protect the security of the world’s largest oil producing nation and the freeing of the foreign nationals held hostage.  Yet if Iraq literally complies with these conditions, it would leave its war machine intact, enabling them to resume their protection racket and aggressions after the siege has been lifted and they have the opportunity to develop more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction.

          Although a person of congeniality and integrity, George Bush was elected to office without a mandate and without having to specify his goals  (“You know, the vision thing”).  Consequently, Americans have gotten what we voted for, a scattershot flip-flop administration that has been more concerned with our nation’s critical problems: the growing budget deficit, the trade imbalance, the precarious condition of financial institutions and the deterioration of urban life.  Instead, Mr. Bush anointed himself  “ The Education President”, declared war on drugs, spoke out against flag burning and even found the time to criticize Roseanne Barr’s rendition of the Star Spangled Banner.

          Unlike his predecessor, George Bush does not have a set of core principles.  A politician of convenience and conciliation, it is his nature to seek consensus solutions to problems.  He knows what he does not want, but not quite what he wants. Characteristically, he is now in the process of frenetic telephone activity with world leaders, from Brazil to Bangladesh, but has not thought much about the ultimate consequences of what he is doing.  Perhaps this should not be surprising when our commander-in-chief is making his military decisions and issuing communiqués from a golf cart while on vacation in Kennebunkport, Maine.

          Having said all this, it should be noted that President Bush performed well at the outset in re-framing what was at stake in this conflict.  Instead of Saddam Hussein, the champion of the Arab have-nots, versus the imperialistic United States allied with the wealthy Arab Gulf States, the civilized world now views this crisis as Saddam versus American, Britain and its coalition partners, which include Arab and Muslim States.  In doing this, he has been showered with international acclaim and his approval rating at home has soared.

          Amidst this applause, Mr. Bush has gotten himself caught in an “activity trap”, as he seeks to further augment his coalition beyond practical limits.  Unmistakably, he does not realize the inevitable detriments of such an expansive and cumbersome affiliation.

          One problem with such an unwieldy coalition is that it tends to inhibit unilateral action.  For example, a preemptive first strike if it is necessary to save lives and prevent widespread economic and political dislocation.  

          Secondly,  in the quest for massive multilateralism,  overtures and concessions are being made to the Soviet Union, China and France, nations whose national interests do not always coincide with ours.  By that I mean that these countries acting in their own political and economic interests, will not want Saddam defeated and deposed.  In the case of Gorbachev, a quick and decisive Anglo-American victory might produce an adverse impact on his growing Muslim population.  As for France and China, over the years they have earned billions of dollars as Iraq’s military suppliers and would like to see this continue.

          Thirdly, whenever you put together an extensive ad hoc alliance you may be forced to forego or at least fudge your national principles.  And if nothing else, the Presidency of Ronald Reagan should have illustrated that when Americans are given a choice, they prefer principles over partners.

          Finally, in the rush to broaden the conjoinment against Iraq, we have already contacted Syria and made back door overtures to faction-ridden Iran.  Considering the bloody past of Haffez Assad and the Persian links to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, why are we moving so quickly?  Before becoming affiliated with these nations in this endeavor, we should at least ask them to stop supporting groups that are engaged in acts of violence against Western civilizations.  Moreover, when Syria becomes part of the coalition against Iraq, Assad will see his payment as a free hand to move against Christian General Michel Aoun in order to extend his occupation of Lebanon – one step closer to his goal of “A Greater Syria”.

          So despite his current popularity, Mr. Bush may be “painting himself into a corner”.  His goals appear superficial, the lengths to which he will go unclear and his larger political conception unarticulated. Indeed, he seems to be having a difficult time explaining to his constituency what we might be fighting and dying for.  In one speech he said we are over there to protect “our way of life”.  Then he said something about defending democracy against unprovoked aggression.  Eventually, in a quest for a higher-sounding cause, he invoked “a new international order”.  Ironically, this sounds like some rhetoric left over from the “Third Reich”.

          Is the United States to embark on permanent intervention in a region that is structurally unstable?  Are we going to become enmeshed in the problems of Pan Arabism, Islamic fundamentalism and Palestinian aspirations?  How do we deal with the history of exploitation and the current reality of pervasive envy between the rich and poor nations in that area?

          Hopefully, the Bush Administration is contemplating these and other question as we become enmeshed in the Byzantine labyrinth that is the Muslim Middle East.  Although the United States and others committed forces at the request of the Saudis, they have always been ambivalent and covert about developing any genuine relationships with the United States and Western democracies.  But then again, this may be understandable from their point of view.  The Saudis know who they are and where they live.  Clearly when one resides in a neighborhood surrounded by three 800-pound gorillas, it is always wise to take this fact into your calculations and decision-making.  Therefore, there is always the possibility that a back channel deal may be struck, whereby Saddam would withdraw from Kuwait in return for financial and territorial concessions.  Where would this leave President Bush when King Faud tells us that our military help is no longer required and requests that we withdraw our forces?  This nightmare scenario would leave Iraq with its leadership and menacing arsenal intact.  Although Mr. Bush might try to sell this so-called “arab solution” as a victory, it would be seen throughout the world as a major defeat for the United States.

          Thus far we have been looking at this crisis from an American perspective, but there is another major player in this international drama:  Saddam Hussein al Takrit.  Consequently, we must guard against any inclination to   ascribe our beliefs, values, concerns and aspirations upon him.  Such “mirror-imaging”, obscuring reality by superimposing upon it a wishful image, can be very misleading especially when projected upon this particular antagonist.

          To the West, Saddam Hussein seems little more than a brutal thug, driven by blind ambition and reckless impulse.  But in the context of his own dark conspiratorial world, he is a somewhat predictable and pragmatic creature, a man of charm, cunning and cruelty surrounded by party loyalists who are held in check by fear.

          Though the West may have been surprised by the adulation that the Arab masses have heaped upon him in the aftermath of Iraq’s attack upon Kuwait, this was virtually inevitable.  Saddam, who has long posed as a champion of militant Arab nationalism, responds to a deep-seated need that his supporters have for a warrior father figure who can rectify the wrongs done by the Ottoman Turks, The European colonizers, The Zionists and the secular non-believing Americans.

          Whereas it is fashionable in some circles to view Saddam’s firing of the Gulf’s guns of August as an impetuous, reckless and irrational act, all indications are that it was a carefully calculated move that made eminent sense.

          From his standpoint, Iraq had sustained considerable losses and incurred enormous debt fighting an eight-year war with Iran to protect the sovereignty of the wealthy, but ungrateful Gulf States.  By moving against his helpless neighbor, Saddam believed he could accomplish six major objectives:

1.  Expunge his largest debts which consisted of $22 billion owed Kuwait and $28 billion owed to Saudi Arabia.

2.  Seize control of the K10, which manages the $100 billion in Kuwait overseas investments.  Last year alone $8.8 billion was earned from these funds, which far exceeded the $7.7 billion that the government derived from its old exports.

3.  Take possession of the $3 to $5 billion in gold bullion that was stored in the Kuwait Central Bank

4.  Obtain better access to the Persian Gulf

5.  Raise the worldwide price of oil, which had dropped below $20 a barrel.  Since 85% of Iraq’s exports are oil the pricing of this commodity is a sensitive issue.

6.  Gain recognition as the leader of the Pan Arab movement.  He would be the new Nasser and perhaps eventually the heir of Nebuchadnezzar, the ruler of ancient Mesopotamia.

          Based upon the American Administration’s “kinder and gentler” handling of Saddam in the months prior to his August 2nd blitzkrieg, these objectives seemed obtainable.  After all, we had overlooked his use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, recently extended $300 million in credits to enable him to purchase our wheat and rice, apologized for a Voice of America broadcast that he had found offensive and Assistant Secretary of State had publicly testified before Congress that we had no intention of getting involved in any intra-Arab dispute between Iraq and Kuwait.  In short, the Bush administration made the invasion of Kuwait look like a free lunch.  Unfortunately for all concerned, Saddam Hussein misjudged the international mood and the reaction of King Faud who, to his surprise, called for assistance.  Doubtlessly, he was shocked by the quick response of the United States and Britain, to the point that he remarked, “What’s the matter with George Bush and Mrs. Thatcher, have they gone mad!”

          At this point in time, both the protagonist and antagonist are at loggerheads, having limited their options considerably.  Saddam Hussein has isolated himself by his act of aggression which is being further compounded by his overblown rhetoric as he pillages and dismembers Kuwait.  George Bush, on the other hand, acting under the cover of United Nations resolutions and international law has “drawn a line in the sand”, while comparing Saddam to Hitler.  More Significantly, Mr. Bush keeps increasing the size and scope of his alliance as he proceeds with the greatest buildup of American ground forces since the conflict in Viet Nam.

          He still says he seeks “a peaceful outcome” but his original tripwire contingent of forces in Saudi Arabia is growing daily by leaps and bounds.  And once invested it will be politically impossible for him to divest.  The road to war, it seems, is paved with peaceful declarations and massive deployments.

          There are those who argue quite reasonable and responsible that diplomacy must be given time to work.  But by mid-December time will be on Mr. Hussein’s side, the American public will be getting impatient, costs will be mounting and the alliance will be showing signs of strain.  By then it will be evident that the embargos and blockage only weakened Iraq marginally.  Pursuing this course, the first to suffer will be the Kuwaitis, followed by foreign nationals and then Iraqi children.  Certainly, neither Saddam’s neighbors nor the world would enforce a policy that results in the starvation of children.  Regrettably history contains no encouraging precedents of such action working against a nation state.

          Although no one should want to sacrifice young lives in a war with Iraq, this possibility has been thrust upon us by the actions of others and by the choices we have already made.  The issue is no longer, “Can we honorably avoid war?” but “How can we quickly conclude the war that has already begun with the least loss of lives and economic dislocation?”  In fact, how we win may be as important as winning itself.

          George Bush is now confronted with distasteful alternatives.  If in an attempt to avoid more bloodshed we accept a brokered deal that would allow Saddam to pull out of Kuwait with his military and weapons of mass destruction intact, we are merely postponing the inevitable.  Considering his ambition and dreams, he cannot be trusted to abide by the terms of any settlement he might make.  Recall that Saddam himself signed the Algiers Accord in 1975, which was a peace treaty between Iran and Iraq.  Five years later without warning, Iraq invaded an Iran that was weakened by it revolutionary upheavals.

          So we are now moving to the point of no return.  Time is of the essence.  With every passing day additional Westerners will be rounded up to be used as hostages, the Iraqi ground forces will be digging in deeper (all the more difficult to dislodge) and there will be the opportunity for the occupiers to wire the Kuwait oil fields and production facilities with explosives.

          Given the current state of affairs, only a preemptive surgical first strike can spare us from these undesirable events and their consequences.  Even those concerned with compromise solutions and restraint might have to agree that a short conclusive crisis is preferable to a long inconclusive siege.  The American people are not prepared to wage a long and costly war to make the world safe for monarchy.  The Saudis will eventually grow impatient with the large numbers of American soldiers deployed in their midst.  The United States Congress will soon get around to making inquiries and will want a greater share in the decision-making process.  The situational stability within the Middle East is likely to change if a stalemate develops.  The international consensus that has been established may start to unravel as national costs will multiply accompanied by increased unemployment and economic dislocation worldwide.

          Currently Mr. Bush has widespread support for taking direct action against Iraq, but this condition and opportunity will not last indefinitely.  As the leader of the collective alliance arrayed against aggression he must be prepared to act by November 15th, relying upon British and American air and naval forces, to bring down Saddam Hussein and destroy all of his military assets.

          Of course, this is not the definitive date for launching an attack.  It is however, the start of a time period when the oppressive Saudi heat abates and the dust diminishes.  More significantly, if the administration does not have a specific timetable in mind it will find that it can easily be distracted by compromise proposals that are dangled before their eyes.

          In the coming months Saddam will start his public relations campaign by periodically releasing hostages and using a variety of intermediaries, from King Hussein to Mikhail Gorbachev, in order to stall the deployment of forces.  He will float appealing proposals and allude to concessions he might be willing to make, all for the purpose of testing the cohesion and staying power of the alliance that Mr. Bush is assembling.

           When this doesn’t work he may try to resurrect the dormant United States “peace movement”, with talk of American boys returning in body bags.  Finally, he may even offer to withdraw from Kuwait, providing he gets to keep control of the Rumallah oil fields and Bubiyan and Warba islands in the Persian Gulf.  As part of this overture he would insist that democratic elections be held under the auspices of the Arab League or The United Nations.  Naturally he would try to rig the outcome by allowing only those who are currently residing in the new territory to vote.

          Although such a deal would fall far short of President Bush’s minimum conditions (the restoration of the status quo ante), many of our so-called allies and some Americans would see this as a basis for starting negotiations that might avoid a military conflict.

          From Saddam’s perspective such a tantalizing offer would be a stall intended to buy time and sow disunity among this broad and disparate coalition assembled by Mr. Bush.

          Beyond this strategy there are other diversions that Saddam can create and exploit.  First there is the plight of Western hostages that he may use as bargaining chips.  Secondly there is the survival and well being of the Kuwaiti citizens who might be forced to relocate.  Third there is the threat that he might release a Brigade of Terrorists in an attempt to de-stabilize some of the Gulf States.  Lastly there is always Israel, who he might try to provoke into an overreaction to an act of terrorism, thereby shifting attention away from the rape of Kuwait to the archenemy of the Pan-Arab Crusade.

          Assuming that Mr. Bush stays in character and the core of his constituency remains supportive, the Gulf Crisis will reach its apex this fall.  When war comes, our objective should be to make it as swift, violent and as far-reaching as possible.  We must hit the enemy at its heart, Iraq itself, destroying its aircraft, airfields, embryonic nuclear facilities, SCUD missile sights, chemical weapons facilities and its attacking the enemy at its strongest point, in the expected place, instead of exploiting surprise and our advantages in high technology and mobile warfare.

          Despite what Carl von Clausewitz called the problems that develop in, “the fog and friction of war”, there is every reason to believe that Saddam and his war machine can be destroyed without incurring substantial casualties.  Just as important perhaps, are the consequences that will ensue from this Anglo-American victory.  Clearly we must be planning now for the aftermath of this conflict to make sure that this war was worth fighting and winning 

          Of course, the wealthy Gulf States and perhaps even Japan, should be expected to help pay for the relocation of hundreds of thousands of displaced people and unemployed soldiers, as well as the essential infrastructure repairs.  Also it will be necessary to leave a multinational Arab force in the area.  But under no circumstances should we permanently station American troops in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Iraq, as this would only increase anti-Western sentiment and work against our own national interests.

          While we regret the loss of any lives, clearly Saddam’s actions constitute a clear provocation that must be confronted.  If history has taught us nothing else, the lesson of Munich was, “sooner’s better than later”.