It’s a privilege and an honor
to write this special preface to the Korean edition of my book.
A victim of its geographic
position, Korea is a mass of land that dangles like a piece of bait into the
Yellow Sea on the west and the Sea of Japan on the East.
Based upon its location, no wonder it has been vulnerable to abuse and
subjugation by the U.S.S.R., the Chinese and above all, the Japanese.
Consequently, one aspect of
Korean character is the ingrained value of HAHN, the
deep-seated feeling of shame, frustration and insecurity coming from centuries
of oppression. But these feeling have been harnessed by Korea’s postwar
leaders into a strong national motivation to achieve, to save face and to
aspire to an exalted place among the world’s community of nations.
Indeed, in the past few decades
South Korea has come a long way. The
country of the Great Han People has grown economically from a poor third world
country to the 12th largest economic power.
And all this can be credited to three principal factors:
First, a population with a
literacy rate of over 90%. In
fact, there are more PhDs in Korea per capita than anywhere else in the world.
Secondly, the hard work, loyalty
and dedication of Korean employees.
Finally, the close cooperative
relationship between business and government.
This became evident to the world
as a whole, with the staging of the 1988 Seoul Olympics – the most
successful ever in terms of organization and of global participation.
But nothing lasts forever.
Life is a series of problems. Truly,
the first of the “Four Noble Truths” which Buddha taught was “Life is
suffering”.
And so in 1977 the rapid
expansion of the Korean economy came to a halt.
As a result, Koreans became involved in many negotiations with Western
Bankers and the International Monetary Fund.
From all indications, these creditors, who were mostly Americans, used
hardball “Soviet Style” Win-Lose tactics to buy up companies for much less
than they were worth or force restructuring to cause many workers to be laid
off. A notable example was Daewoo
Motors, at one time valued at $3 billion, which was acquired by General Motors
for approximately $100 million.
Why and how did this happen?
From my perspective, the
fundamental role that Confucian traditions had in the development of Korean
values may have played a part. While
promoting respect for authority, acquiescence and obedience, some have
interpreted Confucius’ teachings to regard negotiations as begging for money
from others. Obviously, most
Koreans understand that this is
not the case.
It’s a dramatic fact of life
that international negotiations are critically important to the welfare of
South Korea. Of course, I am
talking about commerce but even more significant may be geopolitical
relationships with countries like Japan, The Peoples Republic of China, The
United States and certainly North Korea.
In my first book YOU
CAN NEGTOTIATE ANYTHING I outlined the
Win-Lose Negotiating Style. Moreover,
I explained that this approach did not belong to any particular nation or
culture. It was employed by
Moscow in the days of Stalin, but today it may be used by negotiators from
Madrid, Mexico, Malaysia, or even Manhattan.
The reason that individuals and
corporations use a competitive manner may be rooted in their value systems.
Americans, for example, from an early age learn to be individualistic
and self-motivated. We see ourselves in competition with others and seek
practical short-term solutions to problems.
The typical Korean, on the other
hand, is taught to think of the collective before the self.
He or she tends to seek cooperative outcomes that preserve harmony
among parties and will result in long-term mutually beneficial relationships.
Further, while Americans tend to
be literal in complying with contract language, Koreans often feel that
changed conditions can alter their obligations to commitments they have made.
As you read NEGOTIATE
THIS! By Caring But Not T-H-A-T Much I believe you will better
understand how to get into the world of your counterpart so you can transform
a potential opponent into an ally. In
essence, though written from a different cultural perspective, I hope that you
can relate to my stories and anecdotes and use the ideas and concepts in the
pages that follow to enrich you own life.
Having said all this, let me
deal with South Korea’s most pressing problem: How can we persuade North
Korea’s Kim Yong Il to give up his nuclear capacity and defuse tensions on
the Korean peninsula?
All indications are that both
President George W. Bush and President Roh Moo-Hyun agree that a nuclear North
Korea is intolerable and that a peaceful solution should be pursued.
But they differ on the potential use of force to resolve this issue.
Mr. Roh, it appears, would rely
solely on dialogue and concessions to persuade Pyongyang to drop its nuclear
ambitions. Mr. Bush, on the other
hand, believes that diplomacy works better when it’s backed by the credible
threat to use military force.
The fact is, we need both
carrots and sticks. As President
John F. Kennedy once said: “Diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for
one another. Either alone would
fail”.
From what we know, the recent
Bush-Roh summit in Washington, D.C. resulted in an agreement to restructure
U.S. forces in South Korea. This
strikes me as a wise move as removing U.S. troops from Seoul would make the
capital a less inviting target for the 10,000 pieces of North Korean artillery
aimed at the heavily populated metropolitan area. Moreover, lowering American visibility would undoubtedly help
President Roh politically with younger South Koreans.
By all accounts, with its
bomb-building admission, North Korea has been making all sorts of threats,
implying that it may even test one of its nuclear weapons.
Certainly, such bellowing language and behavior menace not just South
Korea and Japan but the United States as well.
How can this matter be resolved
diplomatically without resort to military action?
What America must do at this
point is to consult with our close allies, South Korea and Japan, to make sure
we speak with one voice. But most important, is to gain the support of Russia
and especially China who is the closest thing that Pyongyang has to a friend.
Although the PRC will never
publicly admit to putting pressure on North Korea, it doesn’t want the
regime to collapse. If it did, as
many as half a million refugees might illegally cross into China. In addition, a boastful and blustering North Korea with
atomic bombs might cause its rival Japan to go nuclear.
Beyond this pressure, there is
the prospect of isolating and containing North Korea – – cracking down on its
of export of illegal drugs and missiles.
Then, there is always the possibility of a UN resolution because the
reality of an unstable Kim Jong Il admitting that he has the ultimate weapon
of mass destruction may be enough to gain the votes of Russia, China and even
France in the Security Council.
Balancing the credible threats
of these sticks with the alternative carrots, North Korea’s little Kim might
well be “incentivized” to take the action we require and diffuse this
crisis.
So as you read this book, I
believe you will recognize that negotiating is an indispensable tool that can
help you in all aspects of your life.
HERB COHEN